We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan pseudometric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change (even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets), and is approximately lower semicontinuous.
1. Introduction. Bayesian games, or games with differential information, describe situations in which there is uncertainty about players' payoffs, and different players have (typically) different private information about the realized state of nature that affects the payoffs. Private information of player i is often represented by a partition of the space of all states of nature (in which case i knows to which element of the partition the realized belongs), or more generally, by a -field i of measurable sets (events) in (in which case i knows, given any event in i , whether it has occurred). It was shown by Simon [13] that Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) may fail to exist in games with differential information, as a result of discontinuity of the expected payoff function in Bayesian strategies of all players simultaneously. The situation changes, however, when attention is confined to two-person zero-sum games with differential information. Indeed, under quite general conditions, the expected payoff function is (weakly) continuous in Bayesian strategies of each player separately, and the Sion [14] minimax theorem needs only this form of continuity to guarantee existence of the value and of optimal strategies for each player.
This work concerns the behavior of the value of a zero-sum game with differential information when players' information endowments (fields) undergo small changes, and the distance between informations fields is measured by means of the Boylan [3] pseudometric. It turns out that the value has strong continuity properties. We show that when the payoff function is Lipschitz continuous in strategies at each state of nature, 1 a mild integrability assumption 2 on the state-dependent Lipschitz constant guarantees that the value is a uniformly continuous function of players' information fields (see Theorem 1) . If, in addition, the state-dependent Lipschitz constant of the payoff function is bounded, then the value is in fact Lipschitz continuous in information fields (see Corollary 1) . Moreover, the correspondence describing players' optimal strategies as a function of information is upper semicontinuous, even with respect to the weak convergence topology on each player's set of strategies, and is approximately lower semicontinuous (see Theorem 3).
These continuity properties of the value (and optimal strategies) in zero-sum games stand in contrast to discontinuity of the BNE correspondence in general (nonzero-sum) games with differential information. The BNE correspondence is not lower semicontinuous, that is, BNE strategies/payoffs may not be approachable by BNE (or even -BNE) strategies/payoffs in games with slightly modified information endowments. This was shown by Monderer and Samet [10] 3 in a setting similar to ours. The BNE are also not upper semicontinuous as was shown by Milgrom and Weber [9] and Cotter [4] .
The continuity of the BNE correspondence has been investigated in two different setups. In this paper, we use the basic setup of Monderer and Samet [10] , who work with information fields to describe players' varying private information, with fixed common prior belief about the distribution of the states of nature. (This follows a certain tradition of modelling information in economic theory; see, e.g., Allen [1] , Cotter [4] , Stinchcombe [16] , and Van Zandt [17, 18] .)) In other words, the underlying uncertainty in the game (represented by the common prior) is fixed, but information endowments of players (represented by information fields) are variable. However, there is a different approach to continuity of NE correspondences, which is with respect to the common prior belief (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber [9] and Kajii and Morris [7] ). In this approach, contrary to ours, the underlying uncertainty (the common prior) is variable, but information endowments are fixed (the space of states of nature is assumed to be the cross product of fixed sets of players' types, and each player's private information is given by the knowledge of his type). Perturbing the underlying uncertainty influences the expected payoffs of all players, but does not affect their strategy sets. However, our setting emphasizes differences in information, allowing information endowments in the game to be perturbed in a way that directly affects only one individual player, or in a way that affects all players differently. Indeed, a change in the private information of both players induces (typically different) changes in players' strategy sets, due to the constraint of measurability of each player's strategies with respect to his information field. Although the impact of these information changes on the structure of the game might appear to be significant, our theorems show that the value and the optimal strategies in zero-sum games are nevertheless well behaved with respect to these changes.
In nonzero-sum games, upper semicontinuity of BNE is obtained at the cost of imposing certain restrictions on information structure in the game. Indeed, in the setup of types, a sufficient spread of the common prior distribution on the product of players' types is needed for upper semicontinuity of BNE (see Milgrom and Weber [9] ; the common prior is required to be absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginal distributions). In the setup of information fields, an analogous condition in Cotter [5] also yields upper semicontinuity with respect to the Boylan topology on information endowments, but only under the assumption that all fields are generated by at most countable partitions of the space of states of nature. Our results show, however, that for the continuity of the value or upper semicontinuity of optimal strategies in zero-sum games, no restrictions on information fields are necessary. This paper is organized as follows. The setup is described in §2. Our results (Theorems 1, 2, and 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2) are stated and proved in §3; Remarks 1 and 2 appear at the end of this section. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. The appendix contains the proof of technical Lemma 2.
2. Preliminaries. We consider zero-sum games with two players, i = 1 2. Games are played in an uncertain environment, which affects payoff functions of the players. The underlying uncertainty is described by a probability space , where is a set of states of nature, is a countably generated -field of subsets of , and is a countably additive probability measure on , which represents the common prior belief of the players about the distribution of the realized state of nature. The initial information endowment of player i is given by a -subfield i of . Each player i = 1 2 has a set S i of strategies, which is a convex and compact subset of a Euclidean space n i . We will assume, without loss of generality, that max s∈S 1 ∪S 2 s ≤ 1 where · stands for the Euclidean norm in n 1 or n 2 . One simple example of such strategy set S i , to which we return later, is the n i − 1 -dimensional simplex of i's mixed strategies, provided player i has n i pure strategies.
There is, in addition, a measurable
At every state of nature ∈ , u s 1 s 2 is the payoff received by player 1, and −u s 1 s 2 is the payoff of player 2, when each player i chooses to play s i . We assume that each u · · is a Lipschitz function with constant K , that is,
We also assume that the state-dependent Lipschitz constant K · is -measurable, and that there exists q ≥ 1 such that it is q-integrable (and, in particular, integrable):
The probability space , information endowments 1 and 2 , strategy sets S 1 and S 2 , and the payoff function u fully describe a zero-sum Bayesian game. To concentrate on the effects of changes in information endowments, we keep all the attributes of the game fixed, with the exception of 1 and 2 that are variable. Thus, we denote the game by G 
denotes the Banach space of all -measurable functions 5 x → n such that
(recall that · stands for the Euclidean norm on n ) if p < , and
. We will call the topology that the · 1 -norm on L is separable due to our assumption on ), and it is also compact. Note that X i is a weakly closed subset of the unit ball, and thus it is metrizable and compact in its weak topology. The weakly closed subset X i i of X i is also metrizable and compact in the weak topology. The expected payoff of player 1 (and the expected loss of player 2) when
(the integral is well defined due to integrability of each u · s 1 s 2 , assumption (1), and integrability of K · ). This also defines U for all
then the common value v = v 1 2 of the two expressions in (4) is called the value of the zero-sum Bayesian game
If a strategy x i is 0-optimal for player i, it is called optimal for i. We shall assume that each player's payoff is concave in his own strategy; that is, the state-dependent payoff function u · · is concave in s 1 ∈ S 1 for a fixed s 2 ∈ S 2 , and convex in s 2 ∈ S 2 for a fixed s 1 ∈ S 1 . This will guarantee the existence of the value and optimal strategies in G Proposition. Under the above assumption, (a) each player's expected payoff is concave and upper semicontinuous in his own Bayesian strategy. That is, the expected payoff function U is weakly upper semicontinuous 5 Or, to be precise, their equivalence classes, where any two functions which are equal -almost everywhere are identified. This identification applies to Bayesian strategies as well. 6 It is also the same as the topology of convergence in measure, and as the Mackey topology if X i is viewed as a subset of L n i . 7 The dot stands for the inner product in R n . 8 This topology is also the same as the weak 
where strategy s 1 ∈ S 1 is regarded as a row vector, s 2 ∈ S 2 as a column vector, and A is an n 1 × n 2 -matrix, with A j k being the payoff of player 1 when he chooses pure strategy j and 2 chooses pure strategy k. Conditions (1) and (2) are guaranteed if a = max j k A j k is integrable. Finally, we define convergence of players' information endowments by means of the Boylan pseudometric (introduced in Boylan [3] ) on the family * of -subfields of :
where A B = A\B ∪ B\A is the "symmetric difference" of A and B. If x i ∈ X i and ∈ * , denote by E x i ∈ X i the conditional expectation of x i with respect to the field . The conditional expectation E x i is well behaved with respect to small changes in , as is shown in the following lemma, based on the result of Rogge [12] . Inequality (7) established in the lemma will be used in the proofs of our results in the next section, and it will be of crucial importance in the proof of Theorem 1.
and 1 2 ∈ * , then
Proof. If n i = 1 (that is, if S i ⊂ −1 1 ), (7) was established in Rogge [12] . (See, e.g., Rogge [12] and Landers and Rogge [8] , who show that E f 1 − E f 2 1 ≤ 8d 1 2 for all -measurable functions f with values in 0 1 .) When n i > 1
9 Theorem 2.8 of Balder and Yannelis [2] is a little too heavy for our purpose (it aims to show weaker upper semicontinuity of U by assuming u · to be only upper semicontinuous), but it is a convenient reference. 10 If 1 2 ∈ * contain the same sets of positive measure, then d 1 2 = 0. For this reason, d is indeed a pseudometric rather than a metric. It would have become a metric if we passed to work with equivalence sets of -subfields, dropping the distinction between any such 1 , 2 . *  ,   1  1  2   1 and   1  2  2 2 (where i j is the information endowment of player i = 1 2 in pair j = 1 2), the distance between them will be measured by the following pseudometric: where C > 0 is a constant given by
Results. Given two pairs of fields in
Proof. For any two given
1 be an optimal strategy of player 1 in the game G 
Note that
(by the Hölder inequality, for p = q/ q − 1 )
(by (7) in Lemma 1)
To summarize, we have shown that 
11 Since optimal strategies exist for both players, and the function U is weakly lower semicontinuous in x 2 on the weakly compact X Using similar arguments (when we start from an optimal strategy x 2 ∈ X 2 2 1 of player 2 in the game G 
≤ max
The combination of (12)- (13) and (14)- (15) If K · is a bounded function, it is obvious that (2) holds for every q > 1 and thus q can be chosen to be arbitrarily high. The constant C = C q defined in (9), converges to the limit 32 max n 1 n 2 K when q approaches infinity. Inequality (8) It is natural to ask whether the value is continuous when K · is merely integrable. Our next theorem shows that the continuity still obtains under this more general assumption. However, it does not follow from Theorem 1 (because we do not have uniform continuity in this case) and has to be established directly (using similar techniques). Proof. We will show that the limit v of any convergent subsequence of v 1 k 2 k k=1 (which we assume, w.l.o.g., to be the sequence itself) is equal to v is metrizable and compact, and therefore there is a subsequence of x 1 k k=1 (which we again let, w.l.o.g., to be the sequence itself) that converges weakly to some x 1 ∈ X
1
. By Lemma 2 in the appendix, x 1 is 1 -measurable, which implies that
and, for every k ≥ 1, let y
Because lim k→ y 2 k = y 2 in the strong topology by (7), there is a subsequence of y 2 k k=1 that converges pointwise to y 2 -almost everywhere; w.l.o.g., the sequence itself converges pointwise. Note that
The first term in the above expression converges to zero as k → by the bounded convergence theorem. As for the second term, lim sup
since U is weakly upper semicontinuous in the first coordinate by the Proposition. Thus, 
≥ min
Using similar arguments (when we start from finding a limit point x 2 of a sequence x 2 k k=1 of optimal strategies of player 2 in games G
for every y 1 ∈ X 1 1 . This leads to
The combination of (19)- (20) and (22)- (23) k to y 2 : instead of appealing to (7) , one has to use the martingale convergence theorem (for increasing or decreasing sequences of -fields; see, e.g., Theorems 2 and 3 in §2 of Parry [11] ). Similarly, our next Theorem 3 also applies to monotonically converging information fields.
More generally, Theorem 2 holds when lim k→ i k = i in the pointwise convergence topology of Cotter [4] . (It is the minimal topology on * in which the mapping → E f is continuous for all f ∈ L 1 1 with respect to the strong topology on L The following theorem follows quite easily from the proof of Theorem 2. (1) The optimal strategy correspondence is weakly upper semicontinuous for each player. That is, if i ∈ 1 2 , and x i k k=1 ∈ k=1 X i i k is a sequence such that for every k, x i k is an optimal strategy of i in the game G Proof. We will establish both assertions of the theorem for i = 1 only because the case of i = 2 requires entirely analogous arguments. We therefore fix i = 1 for the rest of the proof.
(1) Since lim k→ x 1 k = x 1 weakly, the entire first part of the proof of Theorem 2 (leading to (18) ) can be utilized to show that U x 1 y 2 ≥ lim k→ v which converges weakly to some y 2 ∈ X 2 (w.l.o.g., the sequence itself converges to y 2 ). By Lemma 2 in the appendix, y 2 ∈ X (24) is contradicted. We conclude that lim k→ k = 0.
Remark 2 (Optimal Strategies Are Not Lower Semicontinuous). Part 2 of Theorem 3 cannot be strengthened because the optimal strategy correspondence is not lower semicontinuous in general. That is, it may be the case that lim k→ i k = i in the Boylan pseudometric for i = 1 2, and x i is an optimal strategy of i in G 
